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Individuals often respond with strong emotions to being penalised. Such responses suggest that 
informal penalties are important and play a role in creating deterrence. In this paper informal 
penalties are analysed in the context of medical errors. The introduction of informal penalties, if 
dependent upon formal ones, implies that: (i) the optimal enforcement regime becomes more 
lenient, and in some cases the lack of formal punishment is preferred, (ii) the first-best solution 
becomes unattainable, (iii) liability rates and formal penalty level are no longer perfect deterrence 
substitutes. In addition, powers of informal penalties provide a rationale for administrative 
sanctions (informal criticism, reprimands and warnings).  
 
 
   3
1.   INTRODUCTION                   
The economic literature on deterrence and incentives has primarily focused on formal 
penalties with consumption implications. Formal penalties are those for which the penalizing 
agent is a regulatory body (governmental authority) that acts according to predetermined rules. 
Consumption implications refer to reductions in future consumption possibilities resulting from 
material or physical deprivation, e.g. fines or imprisonment. Becker’s (1968) influential model on 
criminal offences is one example of such a perspective. Regulatory bodies (authorities), however, 
are not the only penalizing agents; at least two others exist – the offenders themselves and others 
(e.g. colleagues and peers). For such types of penalizing agents we can talk about informal 
penalties since they trigger negative emotions. Examples are feelings of shame, embarrassment 
and guilt, all a consequence of violating moral (internalized) and social norms.  
The literature on how norms shape behaviour is extensive in psychology and sociology. 
In economics the interest has been less; however, there is now a growing literature on altruism, 
pro-social behaviours, reputation and intrinsic motivations, and their implications on rewards and 
performance incentives [see e.g. Benabou and Tirole (2003) and (2006) and the references 
therein]. Our analysis adds to this literature by focusing on the role informal penalties has for 
creating deterrence. The presence of informal penalizing agents raises the question of to what 
degree they dissuade individuals from certain socially unwanted acts, since they do not reduce 
budgetary opportunities. Questions that will be addressed are: (i) can negative feelings be utilized 
in a meaningful way?  (ii) can such feelings replace or supplement legal sanctions and incentives? 
(iii) can the use of sanctions that do not affect budget constraints in a direct way, but only 
highlight wrongful actions, be explained by taking informal penalties into consideration? 
Examples of sanctions not having budgetary implications, in the following denoted administrative 
sanctions, are warnings, reprimands, informal criticisms, confirmations of “neglect of duty”, and 
exclusion (loss of membership).  
  Some papers in economics discuss the roles self-respect and social reputation may have in 
creating deterrence. Brennan and Buchanan (1985) perceive legal punishment not simply as a 
price of an alternative course of action, but also as a  confirmation of “wrongful” action, and 
claim that the moral dimension in itself moderates illegal behaviour. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) 
present a study of individuals’ intention to violate the law given the perceived threats (expected 
penalties) for three different illegal activities (tax evasion, drunk driving and petty theft). The 
deterrence effect was found to be significant for legal sanctions and shame. Shame was found to 
be more effective than legal sanctions in the case of tax evasion, while equally effective in the 
case of drunk driving. Erard and Feinstein (1994) find that guilt (violating internalised values)   4
and shame (violating social norms) are important in explaining actual reporting behaviour in tax 
compliance. Gordon (1989) extends the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), by introducing 
non-pecuniary evasion costs (guilt, reduction of self-image and social stigma), to explain that 
some taxpayers never evade.  
  Administrative sanctions are frequently observed in professional associations, e.g. 
architects, dentists and lawyers.
1 In Nordic countries, administrative sanctions are also commonly 
used in the health care sector. Examples of such institutions are warnings, reprimands, informal 
criticism, “confirmation of misconduct” - the last being a letter from health authorities to an 
individual physician confirming that some degree of wrong-doing occurred in a given treatment 
episode.
2 Other reactions from health authorities include institutions such as “clinical 
supervision” and “trial-periods”. Both imply some type of time-limited monitoring in response to 
inadequate treatment. In Denmark health care workers, primarily physicians, can be placed under 
the “clinical supervision” of colleagues, while Sweden uses a three-year “trial period” during 
which there is close follow-up by health authorities.  
  Negative personal experiences are common among health care personnel when it comes 
to medical malpractice, errors and negligence. Eldevik (2000) finds that health care workers react 
with surprisingly strong negative emotions to administrative sanctions. Feelings of shock and 
despair and emotional conflicts such as anger, depression and even suicides are reported. The 
emotional reactions that occur in response to material deprivation (fines, loss of authorisation, and 
suspension) are found to be only slightly stronger. Other studies find that significant negative 
reactions occur in response to process (review and litigation) and outcome (confirmation of 
wrong-doing). Jain and Ogden (1999) and Baker (1999) observe that general practitioners who 
receive a patient complaint find the experience devastating. The patient complaint appears to be a 
punishment in itself, regardless of the eventual decision after review. Light (1979), Marjoriebanks 
et al., (1996) and Hupert et al., (1996) study physicians’ experiences with malpractice suits. All 
studies confirm the impression of strong negative feelings among health care workers in response 
to such experiences.  
  There are several reasons why feelings such as shame and guilt are frequently observed in 
connection with adverse events. First, the act of causing harm to others involves significant 
personal costs for those involved, even in the absence of any negligence, particularly if injuries 
happen to identifiable individuals. Second, the very intent of medical activity is to help people 
                                                 
1 The disciplinary committee of the Norwegian Bar Association has the following three administrative 
sanctions at its disposal: (i) confirmation of misconduct, (ii) reprimands, and (iii) warnings.  
2 1 out of 70 Norwegian practicing physicians received a “confirmation of medical misconduct” during 
2005, while 1 out of 330 received a warning (Helsetilsynet, 2005).     5
recover from bad health, not to worsen it, a fact that may reinforce such costs. Finally, errors 
(injuries) may not occur intentionally, as in other harmful activities (crimes, environmental 
pollution and tax evasion), but accidentally. As a consequence, many physicians act in good faith. 
   In the following, I present an analytical model of error prevention and consider the 
negligence liability rule. Providers partly internalise their patients’ well-being (altruism). 
Treatment decisions and precautionary care are collapsed into one decision (effort). Various 
informational imperfections are also introduced. Provider effort is unobserved by patients and 
imperfectly (ex-post) verified by the regulator. Patients’ inability to observe health care quality 
explains the existence of malpractice law and other institutions dealing with quality enhancement 
in health care. The model follows the conventional approach in “accident models” by assuming an 
injury probability function decreasing in effort. Blunders, slips and misunderstandings may 
happen regardless of the amount of resources invested in preventing them. Physicians may err as 
a result of inadequate knowledge or training, and must invest in skills to reduce the probability of 
making mistakes (Arlen and MacLeod, 2005). In addition, court errors may happen since 
negligence rules are implemented under imperfect information.
3 It is generally too costly for a 
regulator to undertake a complete ex-ante specification of due care standards (legal standards), 
thus we are confronted with an incomplete contract problem.  
This analysis is related to earlier work on tort liability (see e.g. Brown, 1973; Shavell, 
1980 and Danzon, 1985). In addition the model draws upon the works of Becker (1968) and 
Polinski and Shavell (1979). Important findings in this literature are; fines are preferred over 
imprisonment, optimal deterrence is achieved by setting uniformly maximal penalties for all 
crimes, while the probability of conviction is set at the minimum necessary to enforce compliance 
with law. This last finding has been modified in subsequent works by including risk preferences 
(Polinski and Shavell, 1979), risk bearing costs among non-offenders (Kaplow, 1989), the 
possibility of investing in avoiding activities (Friedmann, 1981; Malik, 1990), legal expenditures 
by defendants and prosecutors (Rubinfeld and Sappington, 1987) and fairness and legitimacy 
considerations. Section 2 presents a benchmark model without informal penalties (the 
conventional model). The role of informal penalties is analysed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes 
and summarises the implications for policy prescription and assessment.  
                                                 
3 A review under the negligence rule needs to legally establish injury, causality and substandard care 
relative to a standard that may be vaguely defined ex-ante. The imperfect ability to distinguish between 
truly careful and negligent injuries introduces the possibility of court errors.    6
 
2.   A CONVENTIONAL MODEL OF ERROR PREVENTION 
A medical error (adverse event), as defined in the medical literature, refers to an injury 
caused by medical mismanagement rather than by the underlying disease or the condition of the 
patient (Department of Health, 2000). The same literature often distinguishes between errors that 
are preventable and unpreventable relative to the current state of medical knowledge. Negligent 
errors represent a subset of preventable errors that satisfy certain legal criteria.
 The model 
assumes provider liability (the negligence rule), considers formal penalties (fines) and includes 
three possible states: the non-occurrence of medical errors, the occurrence of medical errors and 
the occurrence of liable medical errors. The health status of the patient, h, is assumed independent 
of preventive effort, e, and equal to h

given the non-occurrence of an error orh

for the 
occurrence of an error where 0 hh >>
 
. Furthermore, there is a probability () Pethat the medical 
error occurs, where (0) 1, P =  lim ( ) 0
e Pe
→∞ → ,  () 0 e Pe<  and () 0 ee Pe > .  
The occurrence of medical errors is typically not public information. Cullen et al., (1995) 
and Barach and Small (2000) find that the share that remains undiscovered is between 50 and 
90%. Harvard Medical Practice Study (1990) finds that only 6-7% of patients suffering an injury 
due to negligence are believed to receive compensation. Errors that become known to the 
regulator do so primarily because of patient complaints. In the following the parameter 
[ ] 0,1 ∈ q denotes, given the occurrence of a medical error, the share of errors for which the 
provider is held liable.
4 Thus q is the conditional probability of being detected and held liable 
(liability rate). The liability rate may depend on such factors as patients’ awareness of iatrogenic 
injuries, the definition of due care and investments in the review and auditing processes. The 
penalty imposed by the regulator, 0 ≥ t , is a monetary fine (material deprivation). 
Patient-physician interactions are characterised by the influence of physicians on health 
care use (physician agency). Formal modelling approaches of this relationship include some type 
of humanitarian objectives in provider utility functions rather than pure profit-maximization. 
Implicit treatments of agency introduce (ethical) constraints or boundaries on treatment intensities 
(Ma and McGuire, 1997; Iversen and Lurås, 2000), or assume that provider disutility is imposed 
if acting against the best interest of the patient (Dranove, 1988; McGuire and Pauly, 1991). More 
explicit treatments include patients’ utility or health benefits as part of provider utility functions 
                                                 
4 Conservative estimates from the literature find that 1% of hospital admissions result in negligent errors, 
see e.g. Brennan et al., (1991); Wilson et al., (1995); Thomas et al.,(1999).    7
(see e.g. Farley, 1986; Ellis and McGuire, 1986, 1990; Danzon, 1994 and Chalkley and 
Malcomson; 1998).  
  Here, we follow Ellis and McGuire (1990) by choosing a provider benefit function, z, that 
is the sum of the utility of net wealth, U(A), and patient health status. Net wealth, A, is the 
difference between Y, the initial level of provider wealth, and the fine, t, hence the maximal fine 
that can be imposed is t=Y.
 5 The terms h β

 and  h β

are agency utilities, for the occurrence and 
non-occurrence of an error, respectively; here  (0,1] β ∈ denotes the degree of provider agency.
6 A 
strictly positiveβ ensures a positive level of preventive effort in the absence of any regulatory 
intervention. The concept of paternalistic altruism is often used to describe preferences for which 
specific elements of others utilities (e.g. health or health benefits) are included (Archibald and 
Donaldson, 1976). Thus, for  1 β <  our model can be said to assume partial paternalistic altruism. 
The provider disutility function of preventive effort, k(e), is strictly convex. The payment contract 
is a pure capitation contract (fixed per patient and is part of Y).
7 We can now analyse the optimal 
behaviour of a given provider.  
The provider’s expected pay-off, z, from treating the patient is:  
() ( 1 () ) () ()( 1 ) () ( ) () ze Pe UY h Pe qUY q UY t h ke ββ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + + − + −+ − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
,                    (1a) 
which by simplification becomes:  
[ ] () () () () ( ) () () ze UY PeqUY UY t He ke β =− − − + − ,                           (1b) 
where  () ( 1 () ) () H eP e h P e h ≡− +
 
.                               (1c) 
H(e) is the expected health status of the patient, and, from former assumptions, is strictly concave 
in e; 0 e H >  and  0 ee H < .  The following expression, for any enforcement regime {q,t}, 
determines optimal preventive effort, e :  
[ ] () () () ( ) () −− − = ee e H e P eqUY UY t k e β                        (2) 
Optimal preventive effort equates marginal net benefits (sum of the marginal agency utility and 
the marginal reduction in the expected penalty) with the marginal disutility of effort. U(Y)-U(Y-t), 
                                                 
5 The complete provider benefit function is as follows;  (,,) () Z A fh UA f h β = ++ where f is the health stock of 
providers. Here we ignore f since the health of providers is assumed constant.    
6 Ellis and McGuire define β as the constant rate of substitution between wealth (net income) and benefits 
from treatment, where β =1 is denoted as “perfect agency”. This term may be confusing since providers, 
contingent upon payment schedules, will trade-off patient’s benefits with own net income (partial agency). 
Providers represent the full interest of patients only when own financial motivations are absent. Income-
leisure models and pure profit maximizing providers are opposite extremes (absent agency).    
7 Pure altruistic preferences add nothing new as long co-payments are independent of provider effort.    8
called the income penalty, is the utility loss if the provider is penalised by t. The second order 
condition (s.o.c.) is available in App. A.1. Eq. (2) implicitly defines effort as function of both 
policy parameters: (,) = eE q t , and their impacts are found by differentiating (2) with respect to 















== −>                                 (3b) 
Eqs. (3a,b) confirm the standard conclusions that preventive effort improves with higher fines  
and liability rates (improved deterrence). A provider invests least preventive effort (tests,  
precautionary care, number of visits, second opinions) when unregulated ( 0 = = qt ).   
  To rank and compare various solutions we need to define a criteria function. The social 
welfare function, S, is defined as the unweighted sum of provider utility and patient utility minus 
social costs (liability costs and rehabilitation costs). The provider utility function, z, is defined 
above, while the patient benefit function, B, is as follows: (,) () B wh Uw h = +  where w is the initial 
wealth level of the patient. It follows from our specification that the patient, unlike the provider, 
is non-altruistic. The liability cost function is m(q) where  0 > q m  and  0 qq m ≥ , and is meant to 
reflect audit costs, review costs and conflict resolution costs, e.g. legal costs. Although the 
liability rate (q) is a function of patient complaints, it is partly under regulator influence and can, 
for example, be affected by: (i) changing the rules, (ii) informational campaigns, and (iii) various 
other investments. Examples include changing due care standards and burdens of proof, making 
whistle-blowing mandatory, investing to reduce the frequency of court errors, undertaking more 
thorough investigations in response to patient complaints, and encouraging self-reporting by, for 
example, lowering the administrative costs of reporting. Rehabilitation costs, C, refer to costs 
beyond patient utility losses that follow from adverse events. Examples are investments in 
rehabilitation, medical expenses, new tests and longer hospital stays. Vincent et al., (2001) find 
that adverse events extend hospital stays by an average of eight days.
9  
  Two choices in our specification of welfare function need to be clarified. The first issue 
concerns our inclusion of altruistic preferences, which means that health benefits now enter twice 
                                                 
8 Arguments are omitted whenever doing so creates no confusion. 
9 Such costs are important but often ignored in models on medical malpractice. Kohn et al., (1999) find that 
in 1997 annual costs in the United States associated with preventable medical errors amounted to $17-29 
billions. More than 50% of these costs were health care costs. Such costs are seldom borne by the 
individual providers but by hospitals and/or third-party payers (insurers).         9
in social welfare: first, because of patients’ own evaluation (patient utilities), and second, because 
of providers’ evaluation (agency utilities). The literature on physician agency frequently uses a 
different approach. Ellis and McGuire (1990) ignore patients’ benefits in the physicians’ objective 
function when defining social welfare in order to avoid “double-counting” of patient benefits. The 
same approach is chosen by Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) on the grounds that benevolence 
represents a desire to do what is in the social interest and, as such, should have no role in 
determining what the social interest is.
10  
  Kennett (1980) refers to a particular type of altruism, genuine altruism, where the concern 
for others is reflected in their behavior without deriving any utility from the same behavior. 
According to this type of altruism, humanitarian preferences in objective functions describe 
behavior but should not be regarded as having effects on utility levels and thereby social 
welfare.
11 A somewhat different rationale for genuine altruism follows if humanitarian objectives 
are perceived as following from structural models of physician agency. Now altruistic preferences 
become reduced form formulations of physician–patient interactions i.e., portrayed as Nash 
bargaining games, coalition games or games of repeated interactions (see Chone´and Ma, 2004). 
We choose to include altruistic preferences in the welfare function as a matter of completeness; 
excluding altruistic preferences from the social welfare function (the genuine welfare function) is 
a special case of our more general formulation, and will also be discussed below.     
  The second issue concerns whether fines are socially neutral transfers or not. Throughout 
the paper I will, in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, impose restrictions so that 
fines can be treated as socially neutral transfers. One simple way of doing it is to assume linear 
utility functions in wealth (see App. A.5-A.10 for further details).   
  The social welfare function, S, given the above assumptions, can now be expressed as:  
() () ( ) () ( 1 ) () () () Se UY Uw peC He ke mq β =+− + + − −                  (4) 
The double-counting of patients’ health benefits (altruism) is captured by(1 ) ( ) H e β + . The 
genuine welfare function is assumed by settingβ = 0 which yields lower social welfare for 
similar effort levels. The first–best level, ˆ e(full information solution), is derived by maximizing 
(4) with regard to e , which yields (the s.o.c. is presented in App. A.4):   
ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ee e H ep e C k e β +− =                               (5) 
The social first-order condition (see 5) deviates from the private first-order condition (see 2) in 
two respects. First, health improvements are valued more highly in (5). Note that this conclusion 
                                                 
10 However, what is in the social interest need not be in the patient’s interest.  
11 Such an assumption is somewhat controversial because it relaxes a fundamental assumption in economics 
- that individuals maximize their own utility.   10
also matters for the genuine welfare function (β =0 in 5) as long as physicians are imperfectly 
altruistic ( 1 < β  in 2). Second, rehabilitation costs are now taken into account. Hence, the 
provider ignores social benefits and social costs (externalities) which become the very reason that 
incentives are needed to induce providers to deliver the quantity and quality of care that would 
have been chosen by informed patients.  
In the following the problem of optimal enforcement is analyzed. The regulator is unable 
to observe provider effort, and a contract contingent upon health outcomes is designed. Patient 
complaints signal possible suboptimal care and the regulator, by the use of medical reviews, is to 
assess whether negligent acts were involved or not (imperfect ex-post verification). The optimal 
enforcement regime is derived by inserting (, ) E tqinto , S and maximising with respect to t and q. 
By following this procedure, using (2), we find (see App. A.11 for the s.o.c.): 
  ( ) (,) () ( ) ⎡⎤ =− + − − ⎣⎦ tt e e e Sq t E H P CP q U Y U Y t                   (6a) 
( ) (,) () ( ) ⎡⎤ =− + − − − ⎣⎦ qq e e e q Sq t E H P CP q U Y U Y t m                            (6b) 
A first conclusion is that 
** 0 qt == (a non-punitive regime) cannot be part of an optimal 
enforcement regime since both derivatives, given former conclusions, are positive for values of q 
and t sufficiently close to zero. The optimal enforcement regime, given an interior solution, is 
derived by increasing the ratio of q to t, for 
* 0 > q  while keeping the expected income penalty, 
( ) () ( ) qUY UY t −− , constant. This procedure raises social costs, since liability costs become 
higher while the deterrence pressure remains unchanged, thus the optimal fine is the maximal 
one; 
* tY =  since for any tY ≤ it will be optimal to raise t and lower q. The optimal enforcement 
regime (
** , qt =Y) satisfies the following conditions: 
[]




qU Y U C
P
                        (7)   
[]




qU Y U C
PP E
                      (8) 
For a maximal fine, 
* q is set to balance the expected income penalty with the sum of marginal 
benefits and costs (externalities) and a term reflecting marginal audit costs. The optimal liability 
rate 
* () q  increases with rehabilitation costs and marginal expected health benefits, but decreases 
with marginal liability costs. It is also observed that an upper corner solution cannot be ruled out 
since (1, ) q SY  may be positive. The optimal enforcement regime described in (7) and (8) yields a   11
second-best solution. The reason lies with the fact that in order to induce the first-best effort level, 
given informational imperfections, liability costs are incurred, and under-deterrence 
follows
* ˆ () ee <  (for proof see App. A.12-14). 
 
Result 1: Given social externalities and the absence of informal penalties, regulatory intervention 
is always optimal;
** (0 ;0 ) . qt >> In the presence of liability costs, the optimal fine is the maximal 
one;
* . tY =  
 
  Various special cases can be considered. Consider first the situation where the liability 
rate can be changed at no costs. Now, the right side of both expressions coincide and optimal 
enforcement is described by a menu of t and q combinations that all simultaneously fulfill (7) and 
(8). The two policy instruments are perfect substitutes in creating deterrence and the optimal 
effort level is now equal to the first-best level ( ˆ e=
* e ; perfect deterrence). Given a genuine 
welfare function and keeping the assumption of no liability costs, implies that (7) can be 
expressed as follows; 
   []




qU Y U Y t C
P
β −− = − −                        (9) 
It is observed from (9) that the optimal expected income penalty decreases with degree of 
agency() β . Furthermore, a punitive regime, given perfect agency ( 1 = β ), is still in social 
demand because of rehabilitation costs. If, for some reason, the liability rate is fixed at a low 
level, it could be that (7) cannot be fulfilled and we have a third-best solution.  
The above findings confirm standard conclusions about optimal enforcement in the 
presence of social externalities. Optimal deterrence, given costly monitoring or auditing, is 
achieved by maximal fines and yields a second-best solution and under-deterrence. However, our 
findings deviate from statements in the literature that health providers, if acting as perfect agents, 
should not be exposed to any malpractice pressure since the appropriate quality and effort will be 
provided (see e.g. Kessler and McClellan 2002a). In our model, some pressure is needed, even for 
a genuine welfare function, since error treatment costs are not internalised by the provider.
12  
 
                                                 
12 The following three conditions must be met for provider liability to be unnecessary: (i) perfect agency; 
(ii) fully internalised (or absent) error treatment costs, and (iii) a genuine welfare function.    12
 
3.    A MODEL OF ERROR PREVENTION WITH INFORMAL PENALTIES.   
In the conventional model, individuals refrain from doing something out of fear of 
material deprivation (the income penalty). This framework is now extended by including informal 
penalties, e.g. emotional and anxiety costs, imposed by the self or by colleagues and peers.
13 
These penalties are viewed as utility penalties in the sense that utility, defined over initial wealth, 
is lowered in some states for unchanged consumption possibilities. The literature referred to in the 
introduction suggests that at least two groups of informal penalties are relevant for health care 
workers. First, reviews or litigation processes are stressful experiences for those involved, e.g. 
being suspected or confronted by angry patients (the process). Second, when the regulator 
(judicial system) confirms some type of wrongdoing by holding someone responsible, such 
adverse feelings can be reinforced (the outcome). The model presented below will allow for both 
types of informal penalties.  
Furthermore, to simplify the analysis, liability costs are now set equal to zero, but the 
provider will still be portrayed as being altruistic (paternalistic). A natural question is whether 
observed negative emotions (informal penalties) among health care workers in fact follow from 
provider altruism and not because of reasons of self-respect and social reputation. Provider 
altruism is, however, too simple an explanation for several reasons: (i) strong emotional reactions 
also occur when patient injuries are negligible, (ii) emotional reactions differ for similar injuries, 
(iii) the degree to which such incidents become common knowledge plays a role, (iv) given the 
occurrence of patient injury, being under review or not matters, and (v) the implementation of 
formal penalties and their magnitude impacts the type and significance of reactions.  
In the following, the informal penalties associated with each state are described. The first 
state, the non-occurrence of medical errors, is similar to the same state in the conventional model. 
For the next two states, however, informal penalties are introduced. The second state, with a 
conditional probability equal to 1-q, refers to an adverse event for which the provider is not held 
liable. This state yields a utility equal to V(Y) U(Y) < , which implies that providers who 
experience adverse events but are not held liable, are worse off relative to not experiencing an 
adverse event. This assumption captures the fact that providers characterize themselves as the 
secondary victims, being hurt by the occurrence of medical errors. This state encompasses all 
types of adverse events except those for which negligence is confirmed, i.e., injuries caused by 
normal risks, undetected errors including those likely to be judged as negligent ones if they 
                                                 
13 The literature sometimes apply the concept of “significant others” rather than colleagues/peers (see e.g. 
Grasmick and Bursik, 1990).    13
became public, and adverse events that trigger patient complaints but for which negligence is not 
confirmed. The shift in utility reflects stressful experiences due to: (i) patient complaints and 
litigation processes and the feelings of being suspected or being the object of others negative 
emotions (patients, patient family, and colleagues), (ii) various types of irrational self-reproach 
and ex-post regrets about ex-ante treatment strategies, and, (iii) feelings of guilt from keeping 
errors secret and the fear of being detected. The penalty, () () UY VY − , is denoted the error penalty. 
  The third state, with a conditional probability equal to , q concerns adverse events for 
which providers are held responsible for negligence, and yields a utility equal to 
(, ) ( ) WY tt VY t −< ∀ . The experienced loss of utility, () ( , ) − − VY WY tt, here denoted the 
negligence sanction, contains one formal and two informal penalties. The first argument 
in (, ) − WY tt is the conventional effect where fines reduce consumption possibilities and thus 
utility (the income penalty). The second argument, however, is new and reflects a separate 
negative effect of t on utility;  2 (, ) 0 −< WY t t (the crowding penalty). The crowding penalty 
captures the effect that the significance of informal penalties may increase with the size of the 
fine. Taking the derivative of  (, ) WY tt − with regard to the fine yields:
14 
t1 2 W ( Yt , t ) W ( Yt , t )W ( Yt , t )0 −= − −+ −<                                (10)  
The third penalty follows since provider utility undergoes a negative shift even if no fine is 
imposed. This is seen when inserting for t=0 in  (, ) WY tt − which yields  (, 0 ) () WY VY < . Now, 
the loss of utility is  () (, 0 ) VY WY −  (the responsibility penalty).
15  
  The state-dependent utility function outlined above assumes four different penalties. First 
we have the error penalty which is an informal one. Then we have three additional ones, all being 
part of the negligence sanction, of which one is formal (the income penalty) and two informal. 
The two informal penalties (the responsibility penalty and the crowding penalty) capture the idea 
that holding providers responsible for errors triggers negative emotions. The significance of 
informal penalties is contingent upon the law itself since there is a stigma attached to being held 
liable. Evidence, referred to in the introduction, on health care workers’ responses to 
administrative sanctions, e.g. reprimands and informal criticism, seems to support this 
assumption. Although administrative sanctions have no direct impact on consumption 
possibilities, they are nonetheless described as causing stressful experiences - most probably 
                                                 
14 The numbered subscripts (derivatives) point to the relevant argument in W(Y-t,t). 
15 The model-setup does not explicitly consider court errors although the model assumptions allow for 
courts’ inaccuracy. Type I errors, the conviction of a truly careful provider, are expected to cause 
significant informal penalties, but are not explicitly treated in this model.    14
because they confirm provider wrong-doings (blame). Being publicly charged makes providers 
feel insulted, disgraced and humiliated. The responsibility penalty represents negative reactions in 
the absence of fines. In addition, the size of the formal penalty (the fine) can be said to convey an 
observable signal about the degree of wrong-doing. The higher the fine, the more their 
competence and performance abilities have been questioned and the higher utility loss (the 
crowding penalty). The state-dependent utility function is still linear in wealth and the marginal 
utility of wealth is assumed the same across all states.      
  In order to describe optimal agent behavior we follow the procedure of section 2. 
Expected provider benefits, r(e), is now obtained by replacing the utility function in the 
conventional model with the state-dependent utility function, thus we get;   
() () () () () re UY PeX He ke β =− + −                                 (11)               
where H(E) is still defined by (1c), 
and  [ ] () () () ( , ) XU Y V Y q V Y W Yt t =−+ − −                                 (12) 
The following expression determines optimal provider effort, e  (see App. B.1 for s.o.c.): 
() () () ee e He Pe X ke β −=                                            (13) 
As before (13) implicitly defines an optimal effort function:  
(,) = ee q t .                                                 (14) 
Both policy variables are positive arguments in the effort function (see App. B.2-5).  
  Now, comparing (13), with the same condition of the conventional model (see 2), one 
important difference is observed by looking at X (see 12). X is the error penalty plus q multiplied 
by the negligence sanction. Note that the parallel expression in the conventional model is q 
multiplied by the income penalty (see 2). The following expressions for X are derived for each of 
the informal penalties considered individually:   
() () [() ( ) ]
EP X UY VY q VY VY t =−+ − −  
[(, 0 ) ( , ) ]
CP X q UY UY tt =− −  
[() ( ) ]
RP Xq U Y W Y t =− −  
Thus
EP X is the expression for X when the only informal penalty considered is the error penalty, 
i.e., the crowding – and responsibility penalties are absent and so on.
16 Consequently, each of the  
                                                 
16 The notation for
i X derives from the following procedures: (i) an absent crowding penalty implies that 
W(Y-t,t) is expressed as W(Y-t), (ii)  an absent responsibility penalty implies that the W-function is replaced 
by the V-function, and (iii) an absent error penalty implies that the V-function is replaced by the U-
function. If all three informal penalties are set equal to zero then X coincides with the expected Income 
penalty. This notation will be used throughout the paper when special cases are considered.    15
three above expressions reflects one of the informal penalties and the income penalty.   
The social welfare function, R, still defined as the sum of physician and patient benefits 
minus social costs, becomes:
17   
[ ] [ ] { } () () ( ) () ( 1 ) () () () () () () (,) R eU YU wP e C H ek eP eU YV Y q V Y Y t β =+− + + − − −+ − Φ   (15) 
 
where:   (,) ( ,) ( ,) ( ,) ( ) ( ) Yt WY tt Uwt WY tt Uw t Uw Φ = −+ Δ = −+ + −                    (16) 
 
The last term in (15) now makes social welfare to differ in one important from social welfare of 
section 2 (see 4). This term is the error penalty plus the liability rate multiplied by () (, ) VY Yt −Φ . 
(, ) Φ Ytis the social utility of wealth when a provider is fined being the sum of provider utility in 
the same state and the increase in patient utility that follows from the redistributed fine 
( (, ) Uw t Δ ; transfer utility gain).  () (, ) VY Yt −Φ contains two informal penalties - the 
responsibility penalty and the crowding penalty. This is because the formal penalty (the income 
penalty) and the transfer utility gain cancel each other out when fines are social neutral transfers. 
Furthermore, it follows from (16) that  (, ) Yt Φ is strictly higher than (, ) WY tt −  for a strictly 
positive t and equal to  (, ) WY tt − for t =0 since (, 0 ) 0 Uw Δ = .  The change in (, ) Φ Ytfrom a 
higher t, using former assumptions, is   
12 2 ( ,) ( ,) ( ,) ( ) ( ,) 0 tt Yt W Y tt W Y tt U w t W Y tt Φ= −− +− + + =− <             (17)  
It follows from (17) that (, ) Φ Ytis affected by a change in t only if there is a crowding effect.  
The first-best level,  ˆ e , (full information solution) is derived by maximizing (15) with 
respect to e, which yields (the s.o.c. is presented in App. B.6): 
[ ] ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ee e e He Pe CPeU Y V Y ke β +− − − =                 (18) 
The third term in (18), the marginal change in expected error penalty, reflects an additional social 
benefit from investing in preventive measures compared to the conventional model. Thus, the 
first-best level, defined by (18), is strictly higher than the same level defined by (5).  
  The optimal enforcement regime is derived by inserting (14) into (15), and maximising 
this expression with respect to q and t while using (13) (the s.o.c. is available in App. B.7), which 
yields:  
(,) (,) () (,) tt e e e t R qt e H PC Pq Uwt Peq Yt ⎡⎤ =− + Δ + Φ ⎣⎦                        (19a) 
                                                 
17 As in the preceding section, a genuine welfare function implies that 0 β = . The specification of the 
welfare function will depend on the perspective chosen. One alternative approach is to portray the social 
planner as the treating clinician. If so, it is debateable whether both agency preferences and the error 
penalty should be included.      16
[ ] (,) (,) () () (,) qq e e e Rq t e H P C P qU w t P eV Y Y t ⎡⎤ =− + Δ − − Φ ⎣⎦                                   (19b) 
The last term in both equations (the preference terms), are new compared to the conventional 
model (see 6). Both preference terms show up because of the informal penalties (the 
responsibility penalty and the crowding penalty), and both are strictly negative which implies that 
the use of liability rates and fines incur marginal costs for society (policy costs).  
   Optimal enforcement will now be discussed in three stages. First, three possible corner 
solutions are considered. Second, the interior solution is analysed. Third, the interior solution is 
discussed for each of the three informal penalties at a time. A first conclusion is that a non-
punitive regime, as an optimal policy, no longer can be ruled out as was the case in section 2. 
This is seen by evaluating (19b) for q = 0. This again implies that t = 0, since a positive t for q = 
0 does not affect physician behaviour (see 13), consequently the first-order condition (19a) does 
not exist. Now, (19b) becomes: 
[ ] [ ] (0,0) ( ) ( ) ( ,0) qq e e Re H P C P e V Y Y =− − − Φ,                   
which is strictly negative if:   
[ ] [ ]
00 lim lim ( ) ( ) ( ,0) qee qq eH P C P eV Y Y
→→ −< − − Φ                            
The left hand side measures the marginal social benefit from a higher liability rate (q) while the 
right hand side is the marginal social cost from the same change. The expression in square 
brackets on the right hand side equals  () (, 0 ) VY WY −  for t=0 which is the responsibility 
penalty.
18 Hence,
* 0 = q  (no regulation) becomes increasingly likely the lower are rehabilitation 
costs, the lower is the marginal health benefit, and the higher is the responsibility penalty. A non-
punitive regime can be optimal for an additional reason. One way to illustrate this is by ignoring 
the responsibility penalty - which implies that the above expression for (0,0) q R  is strictly 
positive. In addition, (19a) now becomes:
19 
[ ] (, 0 ) () (, 0 ) tt e e t Rq eH P C P e q VY =− + . 
If (, 0 ) 0 0 t Rq q <∀> then
* 0 q = . This occurs if the crowding penalty, (, 0 ) t VY , is sufficiently 
negative.  
  We have shown that a non-punitive regime, for liability costs equal to zero, can be an 
optimal regulatory policy. This may happen if policy triggers significant social costs in terms of 
                                                 
18 From (16) we get that (, 0 ) (, 0 ) YW Y Φ = since (, 0 ) 0 Uw Δ = is zero.     
19 Given an absent responsibility penalty, the V-function replaces the W-function in (17) which gives 
( ,0) ( ,0) tt YV Y Φ= .     17
strong negative emotions and if such emotions induce significant behavioural responses. 
Furthermore, the responsibility penalty, the crowding penalty, or both can in principle make a 
non-punitive policy the preferred one. The error penalty, on the other hand, can not sustain the 
same conclusion. The reason is that the error penalty is exogenous (policy-independent). For the 
responsibility penalty and the crowding penalty this is not the case. Both penalties are 
endogenous in the sense that policy(q and  ) t affect their significance. We have shown that if the 
responsibility penalty is sufficiently high, regulatory intervention, however insignificant, may 
induce deterrence benefits that are outweighed by social costs (effort costs and the crowding of 
provider utility).  Over-deterrence may also occur if the marginal crowding penalty, evaluated at 
t=0, is high. It is also observed that the second (upper) corner solution (
* q =1, 
* tY = ) can not be 
ruled out since both (1, ) t R Y  and (1, ) q R Y can be strictly positive. However, such an outcome is 
less likely the higher the crowding penalty and the responsibility penalty, and the lower are error 
treatment costs and marginal health benefits. 
 
Result 2: Given social externalities and the presence of endogenous informal penalties, 
regulatory intervention need not be optimal
** (0 ) qt = = . Such a regime becomes more likely, (i) 
the higher the responsibility penalty, () (, 0 ) VY WY − , and, (ii) the higher the marginal crowding 
penalty, 2(, ) WY t t − , evaluated at t=0.  
 
An interesting observation from (13) is that providers are affected by q when t=0. This 
makes possible a third corner solution where 
* 0 = t and 
* 0 > q , which reflects the case where 
responsibility is assigned but no material deprivation is involved. By evaluating (19a,b) for such a 
policy choice, the conditions for optimality become as follows:
20   
 
2 ( ,0) ( ) ( ,0) 0 tt e e Rq e H P C P e q WY ⎡⎤ =− + < ⎣⎦                   ( 2 0 a )  
[ ] ( ,0) ( ) ( ) ( ,0) 0 qq e e Rq e H P C P eV Y W Y ⎡⎤ =− − − ≥ ⎣⎦               (20b) 
 
The above conditions are simultaneously fulfilled if: (i) the responsibility penalty is zero or 
relatively insignificant (see 20b), and (ii) if imposing a fine leads to a strong negative shift in 
provider utility – that the marginal crowding penalty evaluated at t=0 is significant (see 20a). The 
                                                 
20 From (17) we get that 2 ( ,0) ( ,0) t qW Y Φ= , while from (16) ( ,0) ( ,0) YW Y Φ = since (, 0 ) 0 Uw Δ = is zero.    18
role of the crowding penalty for reaching such a conclusion becomes clear when ignoring the 
same penalty. If so, (, 0 ) 0 t Y Φ= , which implies that (20a) becomes:      
(, 0 ) 0 ⎡⎤ =− < ⎣⎦ tt e e Rq e H P C ,                       
which, according to former assumptions never can be true.  
An optimal enforcement policy of the type{
* 0 q > ,
* 0 t = }, is possible if the incurred 
policy costs from assigning responsibility (the responsibility penalty) are less than the social 
deterrence gains that follow from the same policy, on the same time as the incurred policy costs 
from imposing a small but positive fine are higher than social deterrence benefit. This result is 
interesting because it explains a frequently observed phenomenon in health care regulation – the 
presence of formal penalties that do not involve material deprivations (administrative sanctions). 
Such sanctions can now be understood as efficient institutions.
21,22 
 
Result 3: Given social externalities and the presence of endogenous informal penalties, the 
optimal regulatory intervention may be one for which responsibility is assigned but no fine 
imposed 
** (0 ;0 ) qt >= . Such an enforcement regime becomes more likely the lower the 
responsibility penalty, () (, 0 ) VY WY − , and the higher the marginal crowding penalty, 2(, ) WY t t − , 
evaluated at t=0.  
  
   Now, the interior solution will be investigated. We know from the previous discussion 
that this solution is likely if both the responsibility penalty and the crowding penalty are modest 
or weak. By rewriting (19a,b) with (16) and (17), the optimality conditions (19a,b) can be 
presented in the following way:     
** *




H P eqW Y t t
qU w t C
PP e
−
Δ= − −                    ( 2 1 a )  
** *




H P eVY WY tt Uw t
qU w t C
PP e
−−− Δ
Δ= − +                          (21b) 
                                                 
21 Administrative sanctions (e.g. reprimands and informal criticism) can be understood as penalties 
designed to create deterrence by utilizing informal penalties. An additional justification has been their role 
as guidance to individual providers (feedback on how to improve future clinical performance). However, 
the presence of negative emotions in response to such sanctions confirms that providers do not perceive 
them solely as pedagogical instruments. Both fines and administrative sanctions can be perceived as formal 
penalties (institutions) in the sense that they both are initiated by a regulatory authority, however, here the 
distinction between formal and informal penalties refers to the penalizing agent.     
22 An additional conclusion from the above discussion is that a higher C (rehabilitation costs), ceteris 
paribus, makes the two corner solutions (no regulation and administrative sanctions) less likely.    19
The left hand side of (21a,b) is the expected income penalty since being equal to the expected 
transfer utility gain. The optimal enforcement regime described in (21a,b) yields under-deterrence 
(
* ˆ; ee < see App. B.8-11). The first-best preventive effort level ˆ () e becomes too costly to attain due 
to the presence of informal penalties, thus we have identified a second-best solution. The role of 
informal penalties is similar to the role of liability costs in the conventional model. If liability 
costs were included, the second-best would become a third-best.   
In the following, three special cases are considered to shed more light on the mechanisms 
at play. In addition, such an approach will be helpful in determining the relative importance of the 
two policy instruments (q and t) in creating optimal deterrence. First, we consider the error 
penalty, ignoring the responsibility penalty and the crowding penalty. We know that 
2 (, ) WYt t − in (21a) is zero when the crowding penalty is absent (see 17). Furthermore, 
() ( , ) (, ) VY WY tt Uwt −− − Δ in (21b) is also zero when both the crowding penalty and the 
responsibility penalty are absent.
23 Since both preference terms in (21) are zero, there are no 





qU w t C
P
Δ= −                              (22) 
The condition in (22) has similarities with the same condition for the conventional model when 
liability costs are ignored (se 9). However, the presence of an error penalty changes the optimal 
expected income penalty from
** [() ( ) ] qUY UY t −− , in the conventional model, to 
** (,) [( ) ( ) ] qU Wt qVY VY t Δ=− −  in (22). The liability rate and the fine are now perfect deterrence 
substitutes since neither imposes policy costs. For the same reason, the first-best effort level is 
attainable. If liability costs were introduced into the model, the conclusion of section 2 would 
matter – a maximal penalty combined with a liability rate set at the minimum necessary to 
enforce optimal compliance. Note that the first-best effort level that now matters may deviate 
from the first-best effort in the conventional model. The presence of an error penalty, although 
being exogenous, introduces an additional private (and social) cost as compared to the 
conventional model. The risk of experiencing such a utility loss in association with adverse events 
will now make it more important both for providers (and society) to avoid such an outcome.  
                                                 
23 An absent crowding penalty implies that W(Y-t,t) is replaced by W(Y-t). An absent responsibility penalty 
implies that the W-function can be replaced by the V-function. Thus,  () ( , ) (, ) VY WY tt Uwt − −− Δ  
equals ( ) ( ) ( , ) VY VY t Uwt −− − Δ . By inserting for the transfer utility gain, (, ) () ( ) Uw t VY VY t Δ =− − , the 
expression becomes zero.    20
  Now, consider the responsibility penalty only (the error penalty and the crowding penalty 






qU w t C
P
Δ< −                          (23a) 




H Pe UY WY
qU w t C
PP e
−
Δ= − +                       (23b) 
From (23a) it observed that an absent crowding penalty implies that changes in t occur at no 
policy costs while from (23b) it follows that a change in q incurs such costs. Consequently, 
increasing the ratio between q and t, for
* 0 > q , while keeping the expected income penalty, 
( )
* (,) () ( ) qUw t qWY WY t Δ=− − , constant, will result in higher policy costs. Hence, the optimal 
fine must be the maximal one,
* = tY , while
* q is adjusted to make (23b) binding. This 
enforcement regime is similar to the one derived for the conventional model with liability costs. 
Consequently, liability costs and the responsibility penalty have similar implications for optimal 
enforcement.
25 The presence of the responsibility penalty makes q and t imperfect deterrence 
substitutes and t the preferred policy instrument.
26 
Now, consider the crowding penalty only (the error penalty and the responsibility penalty 
are absent), and the following optimality conditions:
27   
** *




HP e q U Y t t
qU w t C
PP e
−
Δ= − −                          (24a) 
' ** * *
**
'' '




HP e U Y U Y t t U w t
qU w t C
PP e
−− − Δ
Δ= − +               (24b) 
Despite the absence of the responsibility penalty, both preference terms are negative. This means 
that the presence of the crowding penalty induces policy costs for both policy instruments. Their 
relative attractiveness now depends on their relative policy costs, e.g. a more significant 
                                                 
24 An absent crowding penalty implies that (, ) WY tt − is replaced by () WY t − , now 2(, ) WY t t − is zero (see 
21a). An absent error penalty implies that the V-function is replaced by the U-function. Now, 
() ( , ) (, ) VY WY tt Uwt −− − Δ in (21b) equals () ( ) (, ) UY WY t Uwt − −− Δ . By inserting for 
(, ) () ( ) Uw t WY WY t Δ= − − we get () () UY WY − (see 23b).   
25 However, (23) differs from (7) since a significant responsibility penalty can rule out an interior solution 
(non-punitive regime). The optimal enforcement regime yields a second-best. Considering liability costs 
would induce a third-best.  
26 Another possibility is that (23a) binds while (23b) is an inequality, however, this possibility can be ruled 
out since it suggests an optimal policy for which q=0 and t>0.  
27 An absent error penalty and an absent responsibility penalty implies that both the V-function and the W-
function are replaced by the U-function. Consequently, 2(, ) WY t t − in (21a) can be written as  2(, ) UY t t −  (see 
24a) while () ( , ) (, ) VY WY tt Uwt −− − Δ in (21ba) equals  (, 0 ) ( , ) (, ) UY UY tt Uwt − −− Δ (see 24b).   21
(marginal) crowding effect will change the relative attractiveness between q and t. Optimal 
enforcement can now, dependent on the preference terms, be characterised by various 
combinations of the levels of the two policy instruments.  
 
Result 4: Given social externalities and the presence of endogenous informal penalties, the 
optimal regulatory intervention may be one with a positive fine;
** (0 ;0 ) . qt >>  Such an 
enforcement regime becomes more likely the lower the responsibility penalty,  () (, 0 ) VY WY − , and 
the lower the marginal crowding penalty,  2(, ) WY t t − , evaluated at t=0.  The optimal positive 
levels of q and t will depend on the relative significance of the responsibility penalty to the 
(marginal) crowding penalty.  
 
 
4.   CONCLUSIONS 
Strong negative sentiments in response to the imposition of penalties are common. 
Consequently, such emotions (informal penalties) create deterrence incentives and should be 
addressed when analysing optimal enforcement. In this study such an approach is undertaken. 
First, a conventional framework is applied to study optimal error prevention. Here, standard 
conclusions are confirmed: (i) some deterrence is needed since the private problem does not 
coincide with the social one, (ii) fines and liability rates are perfect deterrence substitutes (optimal 
menu) if monitoring is costless, and (iii) first-best deterrence is achieved by maximal penalties if 
monitoring is costly. These conclusions do not change with the two specifications of the social 
welfare function or the degree of provider agency.   
The above findings are modified when three informal penalties are introduced. The first 
one, the error penalty which is independent of policy (exogenous), has minor effects on optimal 
deterrence. The next two, the responsibility penalty and the crowding penalty, which are 
endogenous in policy, change policy prescriptions in various ways and recommend less punitive 
enforcement regimes. Now penalties below their maximum level are found to be welfare-
improving and no regulation can be an optimal policy. The first-best solution becomes 
unattainable, with or without liability costs, forcing us to search for second and third-best 
policies. Since incentive provision (delegation) comes at a cost, optimal enforcement yields 
under-deterrence, and fines and liability rates are imperfect deterrence substitutes. Furthermore, 
an optimal enforcement regime characterised by a positive liability rate and a fine equal to zero, is 
possible, hence administrative sanctions, institutions that assign responsibility but do not involve 
any material deprivations, can be understood as rational ones. A necessary condition for such a   22
conclusion is that informal penalties are highly sensitive to formal penalties, i.e., a small positive 
fine yields a significant shift in provider utility. Our conclusions may have relevance for other 
areas where informal penalties are important, i.e., traffic safety and workplace accidents.    
The deterrent value of medical malpractice liability has been questioned because 
tortfeasors are typically protected by liability insurance, and because other incentives such as 
experience rating, mandating levels of insurance coverage and informed health care purchasers, 
are weak or absent. However, such presumptions ignore the role informal penalties, which are 
uninsurable, may have in arresting moral hazard. Furthermore, parts of the explanation for a 
number of recent proposals for tort reform such as strict liability, enterprise liability and no-fault 
systems, may lie with the significance of informal penalties (assign less blame).
 28 Informal 
penalties may also explain a puzzle appearing in the literature: Health care workers express a 
significant fear of experiencing medical errors and much evidence confirms the practice of 
defensive medicine (see e.g. Summertone, 1995; Symon, 2000; Kessler and McClellan, 1996, 
2002a,b; and Dubay et al., 1999) at the same time as formal provider liability in health care 
appears to be rather limited.
29 
Values of professionalism and medical ethics are promoted to protect patients and deliver 
high-quality care, and informal penalties, at least to some extent, become the other side of the 
coin. In this perspective, values established to prevent imperfect agency become the very reason 
that external regulation (deterrence) in pursuit of the same objectives, becomes costly. Policy-
dependent informal penalties make regulation less effective, and the regulator can be said to be 
better off in a “conventional model” for which correct social incentives can be designed at lower 
costs. The significance of informal penalties can be affected by policy in other ways. They may 
become less important over time by campaigning against medical cultures of “naming, blaming 
and shaming”, and more important if the use of sanctions is announced publicly, e.g. to 
employees, colleagues and medical associations.  
  An important dimension of informal penalties, as with preferences in general, i.e., risk 
aversion, disutility of effort and altruism, is their idiosyncratic character. Their significance varies 
across providers, institutions (local cultures) and, perhaps, countries (national cultures). Their 
impact may also vary across medical specialties due to self-selection effects among providers. 
This analysis recommends penalties that vary across providers according to individuals’ 
                                                 
28 An injured persons’ right to recover damages in no-fault systems does not necessarily depend on fault 
alone, but also on some objective criteria.   
29 Loss of authorisation and imprisonment occur very seldom and mainly for criminal acts such as drug 
abuse and sexual offences, relatively rare occurrences in normal clinical practice.    23
sensitivity. However, the sensitivity to criticism is hidden information for regulators and will 
typically not be truthfully reported by providers. Hence, it becomes quite challenging to design 
optimal regulatory regimes, e.g. to determine when administrative sanctions become optimal 
institutions of deterrence. The inability to distinguish sensitive providers from insensitive ones 
also creates incentives among providers to exaggerate the significance of informal penalties. Such 
a regulatory problem could be handled by designing mechanisms inducing physicians to report 
their private information truthfully (revelation principle). This is an area for future research.    
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APPENDIX A: THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL   
 
(I) The second order condition for the problem in (1). 
 
[ ] ee ee ee ee z P q U(Y) U(Y t) H (.) k 0 =− − − +β − < ,       A.1 
 
It follows from former assumptions that A.1 is strictly negative. 
 
(II) The signing of the cross partial derivatives in (3). 
  
et e A z P (e)qU (Y t) 0 =− − >          A . 2  
[ ] eq e z P (e) U(Y) U(Y t) 0 =− − − >         A . 3  
 
(III) The second order condition for the problem in (5) 
 
ee ee ee ee S( 1 ) HP C k0 =+ β − − <          A.4 
 
It follows from former assumptions that A.4 is strictly negative. 
 
(IV) Revenues from fines as socially neutral transfers.  
 
The social welfare function of section 2 is as follows; 
) , ; ( ) ( ) ( ) , ; ( ) , ; ( ) , ; ( t q e d q m C e P t q e b t q e z t q e S + − − + =        A.5 
 
where 
() ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ; ( e k e H t Y U Y U q e P Y U t q e z − + − − − = β      A.6 
() ( ) (;,) ( 1 () ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) () beqt Pe Uw h Pe Uw h Uw He =− + + + = +
 
     A.7 
 
) , ; ( t q e z is the expected net benefits for the provider from a given treatment episode.  ) , ; ( t q e b is 
the patient’s expected benefits from the same episode.  ) ; ( qt e d is the expected utility that follow 
from fines being redistributed to other members of society. Given that fines are distributed to one 
patient we get; 
  
(;,) ()[ ( ) ( ) ] deqt Peq Uw t Uw =+ −         A.8 
 
Now, by inserting A.6-A.8 into A.5, we get:  
 




() ( ) () ( ) QU wt U w U Yt U Y =+ − +− −         A.10 
 
IfQ equals zero fines can be treated as socially neutral transfers. This is the case for linear utility 
functions (in wealth).     25
 
(V) The second order condition for the problem in (6) 
The sufficient condition for a local maximum is (Sydsaeter, 1984): 
tt qq tq qt SS SS 0 −>            A . 1 1  
 
where;  
() ( ) () ()
2
qq qq e e e q ee ee ee q e qq S E H P C P q U(Y) U(Y t) E H P C P q U(Y) U(Y t) E P U(Y) U(Y t) m ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − + − + − − + − − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
() ( ) ()
2
tt tt e e e t ee ee ee t R S E H P C P q U(Y) U(Y t) E H P C P q U(Y) U(Y t) E qU ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − + − + − − + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
() () () tq tq e e e t q ee ee ee t e S E H P C P q U(Y) U(Y t) E E H P C P q U(Y) U(Y t) E P U(Y) U(Y t) ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − + − + − − + − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
(VI) Proof of the optimal enforcement regime (eqs.7-8) inducing under-deterrence 
 
Consider the case without agency ( 0 β = ). Assume now that liability costs are zero (e.g.  0 = q m ). 
If, so, first-best effort (e ) and optimal effort (
* e ) coincide. Now, the optimal enforcement regime 
described by eqs. (7-8) becomes:  




qUY UY t C
P
−− = −              A.12 
Thus, a menu of {} t q, ensures that A.12 is fulfilled. Now let  Y t =
* *  and set q accordingly so that 






C U Y U q − = − ) 0 ( ) (
* *          A.13 










C U Y U q + − > − ) 0 ( ) (
* *                           A.14 
In order to ensure equality in A.14, a value of q lower than 
* * q is necessary, which again induces 
an effort level (
* e ) lower than the first-best level (e
 ) since from (3b)  0 > dq
e d .   
 
  
APPENDIX B: THE MODEL WITH INFORMAL PENALTIES.     
 
 
(I) The second order condition for the problem in (12) 
 
[ ] { } ee ee ee ee r P (e) U(Y) V(Y) q V(Y) W(Y t,t) H k 0 =− − + − − +β − <      B.1  
 
It follows from former assumptions that B.1 is strictly negative.  
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(II) Signing the partial derivatives of e(q,t) (see 14) 
 














=− >            B.3  
where 
 
[] eq e rP V ( Y ) W ( Y t , t ) 0 =− − − >         B.4 
et e 1 2 rP q W W 0 ⎡⎤ =− − > ⎣⎦          B.5 
 
(III) The second order condition for the problem in (18) 
 
[ ] ee ee ee ee ee R( 1 ) HP U ( Y ) V ( Y ) P C k0 =+ β − − − − <       B.6 
 
From former assumptions it follows that B.6 is strictly negative. 
 
 
(IV) The second order condition for the problem in (19) 
 
The sufficient condition for a local maximum is (Sydsaeter, 1984): 
 




() ( ) () ()
2
qq qq e e e q ee ee ee q e q e R e H P C P q W(Y) W(Y t) e H P C P q W(Y) W(Y t) e P W(Y) W(Y t) e P V(Y) (Y,t) ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − + − + − − + − − − − Φ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
() ( ) ()
2
tt tt e e e t ee ee ee t e R t e t tt R e H P C P q W(Y) W(Y t) e H P C P q W(Y) W(Y t) q e P W e P P(e) ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − + − + − − + + Φ + Φ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
() () () t qt qee e t qe ee e e e t e q et t R e H P C P q W(Y) W(Y t) e e H P C P q W(Y) W(Y t) e P W(Y) W(Y t) e P q P(e) ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − + − + − − + − − + Φ + Φ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
(V) Optimal enforcement regime (see 21) and under-deterrence 
 
We know from the discussion in section 3 that the absence of both the crowding penalty and the 
responsibility penalty makes optimal effort (
* e ) to coincide with first-best effort (e
 ). This is 





qU w t C
P
Δ= −            B.8    27
A menu of {q,t} combinations fulfil (B.8). Now, let (B.8) be fulfilled for 
** tY = where q is set 
accordingly so that 







Δ= −              B.9 
In section 3 it is shown that the responsibility penalty introduces policy costs in q. Below we 
show how the introduction of the responsibility penalty may induce optimal under-deterrence. 
Given a responsibility penalty for





qU w Y C
P
Δ= −                               B.10 




H Pe V W
qU w Y C
PP e
−
Δ> − +        B.11 
From (B.11) it follows that the responsibility penalty introduces a third term on the right hand 
side which is strictly negative. Hence, the right hand side becomes strictly higher than the left 
hand side for
** ** {, } tY q = . In order to make (B.11) binding, q must be set lower than
** q . Since 
0 q e > (see B.3) optimal effort becomes lower than first-best effort (
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